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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal based on
Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah;
Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3) (j)

(Repl. Vol, 9, 1987);

Utah

Rule 54(b) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, certifying the rulings and
orders as final and appealable; and Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This is an appeal from the following findings, judgments and
orders rendered by the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, of the Eighth
Judicial District Court of Daggett County, State of Utah:

1.

The

Court's

ruling

dated

September

8,

1989,

and

subsequent Order dated September 26, 1989, striking defendant's
affirmative defenses 3 through 7 and dismissing the first cause
of action of its counterclaim. (Record at 221 and 239-41).

2.

The findings and order dated July 12, 1989, denying

defendant's motion to dismiss. (Record at 145-51).
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3.

The findings and order dated July 12, 1989, granting

plaintiff's motion for an order of immediate occupancy. (Record
at 145-51).

These rulings and orders were certified as final appealable
orders

pursuant

Procedure

to

Rule

54(b)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

in an order granting defendant's motion to certify

dated December 5, 1989. (Record at 288-89)

A Notice of Appeal

was filed in the district court dated December 15, 1989. (Record
at 292-93).

The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss based
on claims that the town did not have the authority to condemn and
that the Town of Manila had not followed the proper statutory
procedures

for

condemnation.

The

court

also

granted

plaintiff's motion for an order of immediate occupancy.
defendant/appellant

seeks

to

have

the

trial

court's

the
The
order

reversed on the issue of the town's authority to condemn and to
remand for a full hearing on the merits as to the issue of
whether

the

Town

has

met

the

condemnation.

2

statutory

requisites

for

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Issue I

Whether

the

Town

is

condemnation, real property

prohibited
located

from

acquiring

by

outside of its corporate

boundaries for a sewage lagoon.

Issue II

Whether municipalities classified as "Towns" are excluded
from the delegation

of the power to condemn under the Utah

Constitution.

Issue III

Whether
interest

the

statutory

in real property

power

to

acquire

a

fee

simple

is limited by statute to specific

purposes which do not include the purpose presented here.

Issue IV

Whether the Town has failed to satisfy conditions precedent
to condemnation.
3

Issue V

Whether

the

Town's

right

to

condemn

can

finally

be

determined only after a trial on the merits.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

Action was brought in the Eighth Judicial District Court by
the

Town

condemn

of

Manila

land

owned

(hereafter
by

"Town" and

Broadbent

Land

"Respondent"),
Company

to

(hereafter

"Broadbent" and "Appellant"), located in Daggett County, Utah.
Following the filing of its Complaint, the Town moved for an
Order of Immediate Occupancy pending a trial on the merits of
the case.

Broadbent filed a Motion to Dismiss challenging the

Town's power to condemn.

B.

Disposition in the Trial Court.

The Motions came on for hearing before the District Court on
June 29, 1989.

The Court received evidence and heard testimony

only on those issues surrounding the Town's prima facie burden of
proof on the Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy.
4

The

Motion to Dismiss was argued based solely on the authorities
cited in the Memorandums in Support of and in Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss.

No evidence was received on the issue of the

Town's power to condemn.

This evidentiary issue was specifically

reserved on the record for a trial on the merits.

Following the

hearing limited to the Order of Immediate Occupancy, the Court
made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, granted the
Motion

for

the

Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy

and

denied

Broadbent's Motion to Dismiss.

On July 21, 1989, Broadbent filed an Amended Answer and
Counterclaim

raising various

affirmative

defenses.

The Town

subsequently filed a Motion to Strike the Affirmative Defenses
and to dismiss several of the counterclaims on August 1, 1989.
Broadbent

filed a Memorandum

in Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss the Counterclaim and to Strike the Affirmative Defenses
on August 23, 1989.
dispositive

Ruling

On September 8, 1989, the Court made a
denying

Broadbent's

Motion

to

Strike

the

Town's Reply Memorandum and granting the Town's Motion to Strike
Broadbentfs Affirmative Defenses 3 through 7 and to Dismiss the
First Cause of Action of Broadbentfs Counterclaim.
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Broadbent filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure requesting Judge Draney to Certify his
Findings, Rulings and Orders as Final and Appealable Orders as
provided
Court,

for in Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Judge Draney granted Broadbent's Motion to Certify and an

Order Granting the Motion was entered on December 5, 1989.

Based

upon the Order Granting the Motion to Certify, a Notice of Appeal
was filed in the District Court dated December 15, 1989.

FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

The Town brought an action on or about March 22, 1989,

to condemn Broadbent*s real property for the installation and
construction

of a "total containment lagoon" for disposal of

waste water and sewage.

(Record at 1, f 1) .

The Town then

sought an order of immediate occupancy which was granted over
Broadbentfs

objection.

(Record

at

9 and

149; transcript

of

hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 5-25).

2.

The property which the Town has condemned

is prime

agricultural land adjacent to Flaming Gorge National Recreation
Area, ("Property").

(Record at 126, f 3).
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3.

The

boundaries

Property

is

of the Town

located

outside

of Manila and

of

the

municipal

ijs in Daggett County.

(Transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 19,
lines 22-23) .

4.

This farmland is part of a larger contiguous parcel of

land which is currently producing alfalfa.

(Record at 12 6, f 4;

transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 213,
lines 10-18).

5.

The condemnation will take a minimum of thirty acres of

prime agricultural farmland out of production.

(Record at 127, f

10; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page
155, lines 5-12).

6.
zone

The condemnation includes a on£-thousand foot buffer

surrounding

building

purpose

the

Property which

and

which

was

not

cannot be used
included

for any

in the

Town's

appraised value which was the basis for th^ required deposit paid
into

Court.

(Transcript

of

hearing

on

Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy, page 47, lines 15-25; page 4& lines 1-3; page 191
lines 4-24).
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7.

Furthermore, the total containment sewage lagoon will

damage the value of the remaining Property.
9) .

This

severance

damage

is

not

(Record at 127, 5

included

in the

amount

deposited with the Court by the Town. (Transcript of hearing on
Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 43, lines 22-25).

8.

The

Property

is unique given

its proximity

to the

Flaming Gorge National Recreational Area because it is producing
farmland in Daggett County which is largely barren.
127, M

9.

(Record at

11-12).

Appellant was never asked nor given an opportunity to

accompany an appraiser during any inspection of the Property.
(Record at 12 6, J 6; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate
Occupancy, page 194, lines 7-14).

10.

Prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter,

neither Broadbent nor any other officer, agent or representative
was given an offer of just compensation in any amount for the
Property. (Transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy,
page 52, lines 18-22).
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11.

Prior to the filing of this acti6n Broadbent was never

given an appraisal or a written statement and summary in any
amount as just compensation for the Property and/or damage to the
remainder which will be caused by the condemnation.

(Record at

12 6, f 7; transcript of hearing on Order o^ Immediate Occupancy,
page 41, lines 5-7; page 52 lines 23-25; page 61, lines 9-11;
page 194, lines 15-24).

nor

12.

Broadbent has never been given afry notice by the Town,

any

agent

or

representative

of

the Town, of the basic

protections provided by the Utah Relocatioh Assistance Act (Utah
Code Ann., §§ 57-12-1 et seq.). (Transcript of hearing on Order
of Immediate Occupancy, page 41, lines 14^22; page 52, lines 417; page 62, lines 10-13).
or

representative

of

Furthermore, rto other officer, agent

Broadbent

has been

given

such notice.

(Record at 127, J 8).

13.
location

At least three alternative sitesl are available for the
of

the

lagoon.

The

alternative

sites have

fewer

environmental problems and will be more economical to develop.
(Record at 114-16; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate
Occupancy, page 206, lines 1-25; page 207, lines 1-12).
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14,
which

Alternative

can be

facility

and

located
which

treatment

also

available

on the site of the existing

treatment

will

processes

not

require

are

the

acquisition

of

additional land outside the boundaries of the Town or require a
buffer

area.

(Transcript

of

hearing

on

Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy, page 206, lines 1-25; page 207, lines 1-12).
alternative processes are also less costly.

The

(Record at 114-16;

transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 204,
lines 4-25; page 204, lines 1-10).

15.

The sewage lagoon has been identified as a possible

threat to bird species which inhabit the area the Town seeks to
condemn and occupy (Site #2).

(Record at 118-19, 5 11 a - d ) .
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REPLY BRIEF
INTRODUCTION

Broadbent's

Brief

contains

which has been met by the Town.

(1)

three m^jor

points, none of

Those three points are:

The Utah Constitution, under Article XI, § 5(b)

and (c), gives the power of condemnation to cities only
and, therefore, towns have no constitutional authority
to condemn;

(2)

There is no statutory authority for a town to

condemn in fee simple.

Indeed, a town's ability to

condemn for an easement is questionable in light of
towns1 lack of constitutional authority to condemn; and

(3)

There is no authority whatsoever for a town to

condemn

property

located

boundaries.

11

outside

of

its

town

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A.

THE TOWN OF MANILA,

POINT I

The Town urges the Court to adopt a construction of Utah
statutes

which

"acquire",
facilities.

by

would

grant

condemnation,

municipalities
property

for

the

sewage

right

to

treatment

Such an interpretation is contrary to the express

provisions of the Utah Constitution in Article XI, Section 5,
which grant to cities only the powers to condemn, and is also in
opposition to the rules of statutory construction which urge
constitutional construction of statutes whenever possible.

In

order to construe the Utah statutes in a harmonious manner with
the Utah Constitution, the Utah statutes must not be interpreted
as giving towns the power of condemnation.

POINT II

The
cities.

Utah

Constitution

distinguishes

between

towns

and

The Town has not cited a single case which illustrates

authority of a town to condemn private property.

While Title 10,

Chapter 8 of the Utah Code specifically confers upon towns the
12

same powers and authority granted to cities under Chapter 8,
Chapter 8 does not give cities the power of eminent domain and,
therefore, cannot
exercise

be

relied

eminent domain.

on

as

authority

for a town to

Furthermore, the power to condemn

property must be specifically conferred, it cannot be implied.
Additionally, under Utah Code Ann., Section 78-34-1(3) and (9)
and Section 78-34-2, the only right which may be granted to a
town for the exercise of eminent domain for a public use is an
easement.

Finally,

condemnation

of

there

property

is

simply

no

the

town's

outside

authority

for

boundaries

a
for

construction of a sewage lagoon.

POINT III

The Town failed to comply with the statutory requirements
necessary for granting an order of immediate occupancy.

The

court failed to make a full inquiry into both the necessity of
the taking and the compliance with the statutory prerequisites.
The Town also failed to establish damages which would accrue from
the

condemnation

and

the

occupation of the property.

reasons

for

requiring

a

speedy

The court cannot have correctly

ruled on the motion for the order of immediate occupancy without
taking evidence on the damages which would accrue to Broadbent.
These damages have been exacerbated by the deliberate strategy of
13

the Town in forging ahead with its occupation of the property and
construction of the lagoon when the Town was on notice that its
authority to condemn was in question and that there had not been
a final determination on this issue.

POINT IV

Broadbent is not asking for a second evidentiary hearing on
the issues of law, but rather is asking for an opportunity for an
initial

evidentiary

hearing.

The

hearing

on

the

order

of

immediate occupancy was limited solely to the Town's burden of
making a prima facie case to substantiate an order of immediate
occupancy and this hearing cannot substitute for a trial on the
merits according to Utah law.

B.

THE UTAH LEAGUE OF CITIES AND TOWNS,

The League, like the Town, cannot cite a single precedent
for

the

property.

proposition

that

a

town

has

authority

to

condemn

The League cites to the case of Wadsworth et al v.

Santaouin City et. al.. 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (Utah 1933),
however, the question before the court in Wadsworth was whether
"non chartered" cities are actually "cities" within the meaning
of Article XI, Section 5.

The court found that non chartered
14

cities had the same powers as chartered cities since the Utah
Constitution does not make a distinction between non chartered
and chartered cities.

The crucial distinction with towns is that

the Utah Constitution does make a distinction between cities and
towns and, even according to Wadsworth, the courts must follow
that distinction.

REPLY TO ARGUMENT OF TOWN OF MANILA

POINT I:

THE TOWN URGES AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF
THE UTAH STATUTES.

The Town attempts to address the three major points in
Broadbent's Brief by arguing that towns have the same powers as
cities.
has

For example, in an attempt to prove that Utah case law

interpreted

Article XI

§ 5 of the Utah Constitution as

conferring the same authority upon cities and towns, the Town
cites only to a case which held that Article XI § 5 does not
distinguish between incorporated and unincorporated cities.

The

case does not even mention towns, let alone deal with a town's
power to condemn.

The Town urges the Court to adopt a construction of the
Utah

statutes which would

"acquire",
facilities.

by

grant municipalities

condemnation,

property

for

the right to

sewage

treatment

Such an interpretation is contrary to the express
15

provisions of the Utah Constitution, and is in opposition to the
rules

of

statutory

construction

which

construction of statutes whenever possible.

urge

constitutional

Courts frequently

assert that:
[e]very presumption favors the validity of an act of
the legislature and that all doubts must be resolved in
support of the Act. Likewise, it is presumed that the
legislature acted with integrity and with an honest
purpose to keep within constitutional limits . . . as a
corollary
of
the
presumption
favoring
constitutionality, the fact that one among alternative
constructions would involve serious constitutional
difficulties is reason to reject that interpretation in
favor of another.
It has even been said that "a
strained construction is not only permissible, but
desirable, if it is the only construction that will
save constitutionality."
2A Sutherland Stat. Const. § 45.11 (4th Ed. 1984 Revision).

Utah statutes must be construed as harmonious with the Utah
Constitution and, therefore, must not be interpreted as giving
towns

the

specifically

power

of

condemnation.

The

Utah

Constitution

reserves that power to cities, not towns.

The

Town's argument simply violates the basic tenets of statutory
construction by urging an unconstitutional result.

16

POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TOWN OF
MANILA HAS THE LEGAL RIGHT TO CONDEMN DEFENDANTS
PROPERTY FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTING AND OPERATING
A SEWAGE TREATMENT FACILITY.

A.
The Town Of Manila Does Not Have The Legal Right To Condemn
Property.

None of the cases cited by the Town, in its brief at page
6, involve delegation of authority to condemn private property
to towns.
counties.

Rather, the cases cited all deal with cities or
The Town has conveniently ignored the fact that the

Utah Constitution makes a distinction between towns and cities.
The Town

simply has not cited

a case which stands .for the

proposition that towns have the authority to condemn private
property for construction of a sewage treatment lagoon.

Contrary to the Town's assertion, while Title 10, Chapter 8
of the Utah Code specifically confers upon towns the same powers
and authority granted to cities under Chapter 8, nowhere in
Chapter

8

are

cities

given

the

powerj of

eminent

domain.

Therefore, this section does not confer any eminent domain power
upon a town.

Furthermore, the Town misplaces its reliance on

Utah Code Ann., § 10-16-4(1)(c).

17

That section states that:

(1) The governing body of any municipality may make or
cause to be made any one or more or a combination of
the following improvements: • • . (c) To construct,
reconstruct, extend, maintain, or repair bridges,
sidewalks, crosswalks, driveways, culverts, sewers,
storm sewers, drains, flood barriers, and channels;.
The power to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair
does not equal the power to condemn private property.

Nor does

the power to acquire real property equal the right to condemn in
fee simple; that power must be specifically conferred.

The Town cites a Kansas case and a Washington case for the
proposition that precise statutory language on public uses for
condemnation

in

fee

directly contrary.

simple

is

not

required.

Utah

law

is

For example, in Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215

P.2d 26 (Utah 1950), cited in Broadbent's brief at page 14-15,
the

Utah

Supreme

Court

stated

that

statutes

conferring

the

rights of eminent domain must be strictly construed in favor of
the

landowner

derogation

because

the

of the rights

right

of the

Bertagnoli, 215 P.2d at 628.

of

eminent

individual

domain

is

in

property owners.

The Court also noted that since the

extra territorial power of condemnation of property outside the
district was not expressly granted by statute, it could not be
impliedly conferred. Bertagnoli, 215 P.2d at 630.
Utah

condemnation

of property

Therefore, in

does require precise statutory

language and precise confirmation of the power of eminent domain.

18

The Town also relies on Utah Code Ann. , § 78-34-1(3), (9)
as authority for the exercise of eminent domain for all public
uses

and

for

sewerage

of

any

city

or

town.

The

Town

conveniently fails to bring to the Court's attention Utah Code
Ann., § 78-34-2.

This section provides that only the specific

public uses mentioned in subparagraph 1 may be condemned in fee
simple

and

that

subparagraph
easement.

for

1, the

any
only

other

public use not mentioned

right which

may be granted

in

is an

The uses mentioned in subparagraph 1 are:

A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or
grounds or for permanent buildings, for reservoirs and
dams and permanent flooding occasioned thereby or for
an outlet or for a flow, or for a place for the deposit
of debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter, or
other place for the reduction of ores or for solar
evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery
of minerals in solution; provided that where surface
ground is underlaid with minerals, coal or other
deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extraction,
only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface
ground over such deposits.
A sewage system is not covered by subparagraph 1 and therefore
falls under sub-paragraph

2, which grants "an easement, when

taken for any other use."
simple

as

§

78-34-2

The Town could not condemn in fee

places

limitations

upon

the

right

of

condemnation for public uses.

The Town misconstrues Utah Code Ann., § 10-16-3(9) and Utah
Code

Ann. ,

§

10-16-4 (1) (c)

as

being

authority

for

the

proposition that the Utah Legislature has given the power to any
19

municipality to construct sewer systems and acquire any property
necessary or advisable for its construction.

Article XI § 5(c)

of the Utah Constitution specifically authorizes cities to "make
local improvements and to acquire by condemnation or otherwise,
property

within

its

improvement . . . ."
condemn.

corporate

limits

necessary

for

such

Towns have no constitutional authority to

The authority to acquire property for improvements

granted to municipalities in § 10-16-4 (1) (1) can only mean that
as to towns such acquisition must be by means other than through
condemnation or, alternatively, that "municipality11 must refer
here only to cities.

The statute must be construed in such a

manner as to uphold its constitutionality.

2A

Sutherland Stat.

Const. § 45.11 (4th Ed. 1984 Revision).

The Town also quotes from the Municipal Bond Act on funding
for a sewer system and argues that since a bond may be given
whether

or

municipality

not

the

that

property

somehow

lies within the

this gives the Town

limits of the
the power to

condemn property lying outside of its corporate boundary.
conclusion is both illogical and contrary to Utah law.

20

This

B.
There Is No Authority For Condemnation
Boundaries For Construction Of A Sewage Lagoon.

Outside

Town

The Town seems to make the general argument that since it
needs the power of eminent domain to acquire property located
outside of its corporate boundaries it must necessarily possess
this power and authority.

Utah Law, however, simply does not

confer upon towns the power to condemn property.

Additionally,

there is no authority whatsoever for condemnation of property
outside a town's boundaries for construction of a sewage lagoon.
See,

discussion

in

Broadbent's brief

at Point

II, pages 19

through 22, and Point III pages 23 through 25.

POINT III:

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE A FULL INQUIRY INTO
THE NECESSITY OF THE TAKING IN THIS CASE NOR THE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY PREREQUISITES.

It is an abuse of discretion to grant an order of immediate
occupancy without making full inquiry into both the necessity of
the taking and compliance with the statutory prerequisites.

See,

Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 182 (Utah 1977), cited
and discussed in Broadbent's brief at pages 27 through 28.

The

trial court did neither.

The Town failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. , § 78-34-9
which

requires

the

Town to establish the damage which will
21

accrue from the condemnation and the reasons for requiring a
speedy occupation of the property.

The granting or refusal of a

motion for immediate occupancy must be decided according to the
equity of the case and the relative damages which may accrue to
the parties.

Utah Department of Transportation v. Hatch, 613

P. 2d 764 (Utah 1980).

The court cannot have correctly ruled on

the motion without taking evidence on the damages which would
accrue to the owner of the property. Such damages have been
exacerbated by the deliberate strategy of the Town in forging
ahead with its occupation of the property and construction of the
lagoon when it was on notice that its authority to condemn was in
question and there had not been a final determination of this
issue.

POINT IV:

BROADBENT HAS NEVER HAD A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.

The Town urges this Court to believe that Broadbent is
asking for a second evidentiary hearing on the issues of law.
Broadbent is not asking for a second evidentiary hearing, but
rather

is asking

hearing.

for opportunity

for an

initial

evidentiary

The hearing that the Town considered to be a full

hearing on the merits was the hearing on the order of immediate
occupancy

which

was

limited

solely

to the Town's burden of

making a prima facie case to substantiate an order of immediate
22

occupancy.

Broadbent's counsel specifically reserved the issues

surrounding the merits for trial.

See, Brief of Appellant at

page 34.

In Utah State Road Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d

821

(Utah 1984), the court held that the State's right to condemn,
if challenged, can finally be determined only after a trial on
the merits and not at the hearing on the motion for immediate
occupancy.

Friberg is controlling and is not distinguishable

from the present case.

Neither in Fribeyg nor in the present

case was there a full evidentiary hearing.

See, discussion of

Friberg in Broadbentfs brief at pages 3 3 through 35.

See also.

State v. Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, 8 Utah 20, 236, -238,
332 P.2d 926 (927) 1958.

RESPONSE TO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE UTAH LEAGUE OF
CITIES AND TOWNS

The Utah League of Cities and Towns (the "League") relies
on the case of Wadsworth et. al. v. Sant^quin City et al. , 83
Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (Utah 1933).

The issue in that case was

whether or not a non-chartered city could utilize the powers
conferred upon cities to issue revenue borids.

The League, like

the Town, has not cited a single precedent for the proposition
that

a

town

has

the

authority
23

to

condemn

property

located

outside of its corporate boundaries.

Rather they rely on a case

which weighs the relative rights of chartered and non-chartered
cities.

The

point

in Wadsworth was that Article

granted certain powers to "cities."
court

in

Wadsworth

was: are

XI, Section 5

The question before the

"non-chartered"

cities

"cities" within the meaning of Article XI, Section 5?

actually
The Court

found that non-chartered cities had the same powers as chartered
cities since the Utah Constitution does not make a distinction
between non-chartered cities and cities.
168.

Wadsworth, 28 P. 2d at

The crucial distinction here is that the Utah Constitution

does make a distinction between cities and towns.

Even according

to Wadsworth, the courts must follow that distinction.

The League also tries to argue, like the Town, that since
towns need the extra territorial power of condemnation they must
necessarily have it.

This is simply not the law in the State of

Utah.

The League also argues that a town can maintain a sewer
system located outside of its boundary.

Even if towns are given

the power to maintain a sewer system, that power of maintenance
does not equal the power of condemnation.
24

CONCLUSION

Broadbent urges this Court to reverse the decision of the
District Court on the issue of the Town's authority to condemn
and remand the case with instructions for a full evidentiary
hearing

on the conditions precedent to condemnation

and the

Town's right to condemn property in fee simple located outside
of

its

corporate

boundaries

for

construction

of

a

sewage

treatment lagoon.

DATED this [i day of June, 1990,

VAN WAGONER & STEVENS
Lewis T. Stevens
Kristin G* Brewer

By: ^ ^ ^ r ( W ^ V ^
Attorneys
Itorneys for App€
Appellant
Broadbent Land Company
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article XI, § 5(b) and (c)

viii

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, Article XI, § 5.
Sec, 5. [Municipal corporations - To be created by general law
- Right and manner of adopting charter for own
government - Powers included•]
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created
by special laws.
The legislature by general laws^ shall
provide for the incorporation, organization and classification
of cities and towns in proportion to population, which laws
may be altered, amended or repealed. Any incorporated city or
town may frame and adopt a charger for its own government in
the following manner:
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds
vote of its members, and upon petition of qualified electors
to the number of fifteen per cent of all votes cast at the
next preceding election for the office of the mayor, shall
forthwith provide by ordinance for the submission to the
electors of the question:
"Shall a commission be chosen to
frame a character?"
The ordinance shall require that the
question be submitted to the electors at the next regular
municipal election. The ballot containing such question shall
also contain the names of candidates for members of the
proposed commission, but without party designation.
Such
candidates shall be nominated in the same manner as required
by law for nomination of city officers. If a majority of the
electors voting on the question of choosing a commission shall
vote in the affirmative, then the fifteen candidates receiving
a majority of the votes case at such election, shall
constitute the charter commission, and shall proceed to frame
a charter.
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified
electors of the city at an election to be held at a time to be
determined by the charter commission, which shall be not less
than sixty days subsequent to its completion and distribution
among the electors and not more than one year from such date.
Alternative provisions may also be submitted to be voted upon
separately.
The commission shall make provisions for the
distribution of copies of the proposed charter and of any
alternative provisions to the qualified electors of the city,
not less than sixty days before the ejection at which it is
voted upon.
Such proposed charter and such alternative
provisions as are approved by a majority of the electors
voting thereon, shall become an organic law of such city at
such time as may be fixed therein, a^id shall supersede any
existing charter and all laws affecting the organization and
government of such city which are now in conflict therewith.
Within thirty days after its approval a copy of such charter
as adopted, certified by the mayor and city recorder and
authenticated by the seal of such city, shall be made in
duplicate and deposited, one in the office of the secretary of

Constitution of Utah, Article XI, § 5 continued.
State and the other in the office of the city recorder, and
thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of such
charter.
Amendments to any such charter may be framed and
submitted by a charter commission in the same manner as
provided for making of charters, or may be proposed by the
legislative authority of the city upon a two-thirds vote
thereof, or by petition of qualified electors to a number
equal to fifteen per cent of the total votes cast for mayor on
the next preceding election, and any such amendment may be
submitted at the next regular municipal election, and having
been approved by the majority of the electors voting thereon,
shall become part of the charter at the time fixed in such
amendment and shall be certified and filed as provided in case
of charters.
Each city forming its charter under this section shall
have, and is hereby granted, the authority to exercise all
powers relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt and enforce
within
its limits, local police, sanitary and similar
regulations not in conflict with the general law, and no
enumeration of powers in this Constitution or any law shall be
deemed to limit or restrict the general grant of authority
hereby conferred; but this grant of authority shall not
include the power to regulate public utilities, not
municipally owned, if any such regulation of public utilities
is provided for by general law, nor be deemed to limit or
restrict the power of the legislature in matters relating to
State affairs, to enact general laws applicable alike to all
cities of the State.
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section
shall include the following:
(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow money,
within the limits prescribed by general law, and to levy
and collect special assessments for benefits conferred.
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase,
hire, construct, own, maintain or operate, or lease, public
utilities
local
in extent
and use; to acquire by
condemnation, or otherwise, within or without the corporate
limits, property necessary for any such purposes, subject to
restrictions imposed by general law for the protection of
other communities; and to grant local public utility
franchises and within its powers regulate the exercise
thereof.
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by
condemnation, or otherwise, property within its corporate

Constitution of Utah, Article XI, § 5 continued.
limits necessary for such improvements; and also to acquire
an excess over than [that] needed for any such improvement
and to sell or lease such excess property with restrictions,
in order to protect and preserve the improvement.
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such
excess property, or of any public utility owned by the city,
or of the revenues thereof, or both, including, in the case
of public utility, a franchise stating the terms upon which,
in case of foreclosure, the purchaser may operate such
utility. (As amended November 8, 1932, effective January 1,
1933.)

U t a h Code A n n o t a t e d ,

ix

§ 78-2-£(3)(j)

78-2-2(3)(j)

Supreme Court jurisdiction.

(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original
appellate jurisdiction.

Utah Code Annotated. § 57-l£-l et. seq.

x

57-12-1.

Short title.

This act shall be known and may be cited
"Utah Relocation Assistance Act."

57-12-2.

as the

Declaration of policy.

This is hereby declared to be the policy of this act
and of the state of Utah, and the Legislature recognizes:
(1) That it is often necessary for the various
agencies of state and local government to acquire land by
condemnation;
(2) That persons, businesses, and farms are often
uprooted and displaced by such action while being recompensed
only for the value of land taken;
(3) That such displacement often works economic
hardship on those least able to suffer the added and
uncompensated costs of moving, locating new homes, business
sites, farms, and other costs of being relocated;
(4) That such added expenses should reasonably be
included as a part of the project cost and paid to those
displaced;
(5) That the Congress of the United States has
established matching grants for relocation assistance, and has
also established uniform policies for land acquisition under
the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970, to assist the states in meeting these expenses
and assuring that land is fairly acquired;
(6) That it is in the public interest for the state
of Utah to provide for such payments and to establish such land
acquisition policies.
Therefore, the purpose of this act is to establish a
uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment of persons
displaced by the acquisition of real property by state and
local land acquisition programs, by building code enforcement
activities, or by a program of voluntary rehabilitation of
buildings
or other
improvements
conducted pursuant to
governmental supervision.
All of the provisions of the act shall be liberally
construed to put into effect the foregoing policies and
purposes.

Utah Code Annotated. § 1 0 - 1 ^ - 3 ( 9 )

xi

10-16-3.

Cities and Towns.

(9) "Municipality" means a city or town of this state.

Utah Code Annotated. § 10-16-4(1)(c) and (1)

xii

10-16-4.

POWERS OF MUNICIPALITY.

(1) The government body of any municipality may make or cause
to be made any one or more or combination of the following
improvements:
(c) to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain, or
repair bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks, driveways, culverts,
sewers, storm sewers, drains, flood barriers, and channels;
(1) to acquire any property necessary or advisable in
order to make any of these improvements;

Utah Code Annotated, § 78-^4-2

xiii

78-34-2.

Estates and rights that may be taken.

The following is a classification of the estates
rights in lands subject to be taken for public use:

and

(1) a fee simple, when taken fot public buildings or
grounds or for permanent buildings, for reservoirs and dams
and permanent flooding occasioned thereby, or for an outlet
for a flow, or a place for the deposit of debris or tailings
of a mine, mill, smelter or other place for the reduction of
ores, or for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities
for the recovery of minerals in solution; provided that
where surface ground is underlaid with minerals, coal or
other deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extraction,
only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface
ground over such deposits.
(2) an easement, when taken for any other use.
(3) the right of entry upon, and occupation of lands,
with the right to take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones,
trees and timber as may be necessary for some public use.

Utah Code Annotated. § 78-34-1(3) and (9)

xiv

78-34-1.

Uses for which right may be exercised.

Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of
eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following
public uses:
(3) public buildings and grounds for the use of any
county, city or incorporated town, or board of eduction;
reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes for
conducting water for the use of tl^e inhabitants of any
county or city or incorporated town, br for the draining of
any county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the
banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and
widening, deepening or straightening their channels; roads,
streets and alleys; and all other public uses for the
benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or the
inhabitants thereof.
(9) sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of
not less than ten families, or of any public building
belonging to the state, or of any college or university•

Utah Code Annotated. § 78-34H9

xv

78-34-9.

Occupancy of premises pending action - Deposit paid
into court - Procedure for payment of compensation.

The plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof, at
any time after the commencement of suit, on notice to the
defendant, if he is a resident of the state, or has appeared
by attorney in the action, otherwise by serving a notice
directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order
permitting the plaintiff to occupy the premises sought to be
condemned pending the action, including appeal, and to do such
work thereon as may be required. The court or a judge thereof
shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the
premises sought to be condemned and of the damages which will
accrue from the condemnation, and of the reasons for requiring
a speedy occupation, and shall grant or refuse the motion
according to the equity of the case and the relative damages
which may accrue to the parties. If the motion is granted,
the court or judge shall enter its order requiring the
plaintiff as a condition precedent to occupancy to file with
the clerk of the court a sum equivalent to at least 75% of the
condemning authority's appraised valuation of the property
sought to be condemned. The amount thijis fixed shall be for
the purposes of the motion only, and shall not be admissible
in evidence on final hearing.
The rights of the just
compensation for the land so taken or damaged shall vest in
the parties entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be
ascertained and awarded as provided in §78-34-10 and
established by judgment therein, and the said judgment shall
include, as part of the just compensation awarded, interest at
the rate of 8% per annum on the amount finally awarded as the
value of the property and damages, from the date of taking
actual possession thereof by the plaintiff or order of
occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment; but
interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have
been paid into court. Upon the application of the parties in
interest, the court shall order the mojney deposited in the
court be paid forthwith for or on Account of the just
compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. A payment to a
defendant as aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonment by
such defendant of all defenses excepting his claim for greater
compensation. If the compensation finally awarded in respect
of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shall exceed the amount
of the money so received the court shall enter judgment
against the plaintiff for the amount of the deficiency. If
the amount of money so received by the defendant is greater
than the amount finally awarded, the court shall enter
judgment against the defendant for the amount of the excess.
Upon the filing of the petition for immediate occupancy the
court shall fix the time within which, and the terms upon
which, the parties in possession shall be required to
surrender possession to the plaintiff. The court shall make
such orders in respect to encumbrances, liens, rents,
assessments, insurance and other charges^ if any, as shall be
just and equitable.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 54(b)

xv i

Rule 54(b).

Judgments; costs.

(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving
multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express determination by the
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence
of such determination and direction, any order or other form
of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.

RUIiES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Rule 3

xvii

Rule 3.

Appeal as of right.

How taken.

(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An
appeal may be taken from a district court to the Supreme Court
from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise
provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk
of the district court within the time allowed by Rule 4.
Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely
filing of a notice of action as the Supreme Court deems
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or
other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of
attorney's fees.

RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREMfe COURT
Rule 4

xviii

RULE 4.

Appeal as of right:

When takert.

(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in
which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the
district court to the Supreme Court, the notice of appeal
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from; provided however, when a
judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court
within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from,
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the
district court by any party:
(1) for judgment under Rule
50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alternation of the
judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under
Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59
for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run
from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or
denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion
under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the
district court by any party:
(1) under Rule 24 for a new
trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment,
affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such
motion.
A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of
any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice
of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured
from the entry of the order of the district court disposing of
the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except
as provided in Paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal
filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment or order
but before the entry of the judgment or order of the district
court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the
day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross appeal.
If a timely notice of
appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a notice
of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first
notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period
last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal.
The district court,
upon a showing of excusable neglect or gpod cause, may extend
the time for filing a notice of appeal i^pon motion filed not

Rule 4 continued.
later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed
by Paragraph (a) of this rule. Any such motion which is filed
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte
unless the district court otherwise requires. Notice of any
such motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with
the district court rules of practice.
No extension shall
exceed 3 0 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the
date of the entry of the order granting the motion, whichever
occurs later.

2A SUTHERLAND STAT CONST. § 45.lfL (4th Ed 1984)

xix

§45.11.

Constitutional considerations.

It is frequently asserted by the courts that every
presumption favors the validity of an act of the legislature
and that all doubts must be resolved in support of the act.
Likewise, it is presumed that the legislature acted with
integrity and with an honest purpose to keep within
constitutional limits.
The presumption is not conclusive,
however, and its actual influence on decisions concerning the
validity of legislation is not susceptible of demonstration.
As
a corollary
of
the presumption
favoring
constitutionality, the fact that one among alternative
constructions would
involve serious
constitutional
difficulties is reason to reject that interpretation in favor
of another.
It has even been said that "a strained
construction is not only permissible, but desirable, if it is
the only construction that will save constitutionality." But
federal courts are without power to save state laws from the
vice of vagueness by giving them definiteness through a
limiting construction.

